by S. Thurner and R. Hanel. European Physical Journal B, 84(4): 707-711, 2011. doi, arXiv: 1008.4324 [physics.soc-ph].
How robust is the peer-review system (as a selection mechnism of high quality papers) under the presence of rational agents i.e. referees who tend not to accept better work than their own? In this work, the authors design a relatively simple model to address this question. We can of course discuss some of their hypotheses but the conclusion is that if the fraction of rational referees exceeds a certain threshold (30% in their model), then the peer-review process does not better than a mere coin tossing.
Should'nt we ask ourselves how rational we are given our unavoidable conflict of interests?
Please, see Michaël Bon's Self-Journal for a more detailed review of Thurner and Hanel's work.
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